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THE COMMISSION AND THE CORPORATION LAWS
Carlos L. Israels*
In many fields of law, statutory and judge-made, New York has been
a leader. The field of corporation law has not been one of these despite
our State's pre-eminence in commerce and finance. This fact is illustrated,
for example, on the statutory side by the comparative rarity of New York
incorporation among the many large national and international business
enterprises of which New York City is the financial and executive nerve
center. The why and wherefore, historically, is foreign to the subject of
this article. Nor would the writer maintain that we should meekly fol-
low Delaware, Maine or Nevada just to ease the burden of the corpora-
tion lawyer. The fact, however, is important because it has circum-
scribed the Commission's contribution: limiting its scope primarily to
modernization to bring New York into line with other states, and defi-
nitely inhibiting pioneering. Within these limitations the Commission
has accomplished a good deal in the corporate field.
In the area of judge-made law the pattern is similar. In the last ten
years our Court of Appeals has decided three important corporate cases
by a majority of one-and in the writer's view, each time the prevailing
opinion was contrary to the modern realistic trend of corporation law.
These cases we shall discuss below, for one of them was the direct moving
cause of a Commission study and recommendation; the second was inter-
pretative of the legislation which resulted, and the third serves to high-
light the need for further Commission work in a specific area which it
studied some ten years ago.
We shall not attempt here detailed analysis of each of the Commis-
sion's recommendations or even of all the statutory changes adopted at its
instance. Every New York lawyer who has had to struggle through the
process of amendment of a certificate of incorporation, to revive a cor-
porate life, or to prove the terms of a certificate "with all amendments to
date" has reason to be grateful for the Commission's careful work.1
The Commission's effort in the corporate field began in 1936 and re-
sulted a year later in the enactment of section 359 (i), (j), and (k) of
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 764, for biographical data.
1 See in these areas Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 19-32 (1944), Laws
1944, c. 591; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 415-608 (1949), Laws 1949,
c. 805; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (P), Report of Law Rev. Com. 857-884 (1949), Laws 1949, c. 804;
and Leg. Doc. No. 65 (N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 389-401 (1950), Laws 1950, c. 368,
729, and 768.
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the General Business Law,2 designed to ease the process of registration of
transfer of corporate securities standing in fiduciary names or in the
names of decedents, wards, or the like. The problem was presented by the
fact that historically in American law the issuer of registered securities is
required to police transfers. Thus, the presentation for transfer of securi-
ties registered, for example, in the name of "A as Trustee" was regarded
as notice of all the terms and provisions of the trust instrument. The
issuer or its transfer agent, therefore, in order to protect itself, had to
be satisfied not only that "A" was the Trustee and had power to transfer
the securities, but also that his transfer was rightful, i.e., within the four
corners of the instrument. In practice, this meant that if a decedent had
specifically bequeathed the shares to "Cousin Jane," a New York bank
acting as transfer agent, before registering transfer out of the name of the
executor would require proof that "Cousin Jane" and no one else was to
receive the shares. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act attacked the problem by
Section 3, dispensing with the necessity of proof of rightfulness where
securities actually were registered in a fiduciary name. However, the Uni-
form Act did not deal with the precisely similar problem presented with
respect to securities registered in the names of decedents, wards, etc.,
presented by the executor, administrator, or guardian. On Commission
recommendation, our New York statute embodies not only the Uniform
Act but an additional provision covering the latter situation. Unfortu-
nately, the problem was not one that legislation in a single state could
solve. Our statute works well where issuer, transferor, and transferee are
residents. But where the issuer is a foreign corporation and the rule in the
state of organization is more stringent than our rule, the New York trans-
fer agent must still insist upon all the technical requirements necessary
to protect the issuer under the laws of its home state. The conflicts prob-
lem is ubiquitous. Indeed, it presents itself today in similar context in
connection with the proposed Uniform Commercial Code.'
Much of the Commission's important work in the corporate field has
been done in what might appropriately be characterized as the technical
area-involving no important change in substantive law, but removing
uncertainties, generally "cleaning up" the statutes and definitely making
them easier to interpret and to work under. Thus, in 1951 ambiguities in
our Stock Corporation Law as to limitation of voting rights were straight-
2 Laws 1937, c. 344.
3 Pt. 4 of Art. 8 of -the Code is a complete statutory scheme to govern registration of
transfer. However, § 1-105 as recently revised (See U.C.C. Supplement No. 1, January
1955) specifically adopts the rule of the case law to the effect that the issuer's liability for
wrongful registration is governed by the law of the state of organization.
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ened out on Commission recommendation.4 In 1952 the law respecting
payments and distributions to and exercise of rights by infant stock-
holders was modernized as proposed by the Commission and in 1953 the
Legislature enacted Commission-drafted amendments relating to ir-
revocable proxies, consolidations of membership corporations and require-
ments for inspectors of election.'
How valuable--one is almost tempted to say "invaluable," can be the
work of a revising body on the technical aspects of a statute is nowhere
better illustrated than by the 1949 revision of sections 35 and 36 of our
Stock Corporation Law dealing with the grounds for and techniques of
amending a certificate of incorporation. 7 The epithet "hodgepodge"
would be a mild one to describe the state of our law prior to 1949 in this
regard. Said the Commission in its recommendation:
Thus as many as five separate certificates might be required to ac-
complish changes in the several provisions of a certificate of incorpora-
tion .... [The certificates] ... constitute, in effect, amendments of the
certificate of incorporation. They do not, however, have [that] form .... s
The basic purpose of the recommendation was to remedy this "to per-
mit the filing of a single certificate by which a corporation may amend
any of the provisions of its certificate of incorporation, by setting forth
the complete text of the amendment." 9 The amendments not only ac-
complished this, but also clarified the law with respect to classification or
reclassification of shares, and our statute now clearly states the methods
by which reduction of capital may be effected, distinguishes between a
method which requires amendment of the certificate of incorporation and
one which does not, and in line with other modern corporate statutes
requires that the certificate filed show the reduction of capital.
The 1949 amendments were based on a Commission study. 10 I cite
that study specially because it illustrates the high standard to which the
Commission seeks to hold itself. Not only was the research itself en-
cyclopedic, but the analysis of the research material is scholarly, pains-
taking and practical.
On the substantive side of corporation law, the Commission's work has
concentrated principally in the fields of derivative actions, litigation ex-
4 Laws 1951, c. 170; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 227-250 (1951).
5 Laws 1952, c. 825; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (I), Report of Law Rev. Com. 259-298 (1952).
6 Laws 1953, c. 538, 843, 863; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (G) (1953). [At printing, Report of
Law Rev. Com. (1953) unbound. No page citations available-Ed.]
7 Laws 1949, c. 805; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 415-608 (1949).
8 Id. at 433.
9 Id. at 434.
10 Id. at 453-608.
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penses of corporate officials, and corporate government particularly of
so-called "close-corporations." The work in each merits separate review.
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
Although the law of derivative actions developed first in England, no
one can doubt that in the period between World War I and World War II
New York became its broadest battleground. Here were myriad corporate
enterprises, large and small. Here were myriad investors, large and small.
Here was an active corporate bar. New York law prior to the 1940's was
in some respects more liberal than that of other jurisdictions as to the
rights and privileges of plaintiffs in derivative actions. Thus we did not
require that the plaintiff show that he had been a shareholder at the time
of the acts which he complained of, though the Federal Rules did so re-
quire.-" Moreover, we had by decision, as early as 1898, and again in
194012 permitted what was unquestionably the greatest evil in the field-
the private "buy-out" settlement, of which more below. On the other
hand, our law on limitations in a derivative action was and is rigid and
uncompromising in favor of the defendants.
Both these aspects came into the Commission's purview in 1940 and it
listed in its 1941 Report as "work in progress" a study on "compromise
with plaintiff stockholders in class actions." In 1942 the Commission
published studies on limitations in and termination of such actions. 3 In
1944 the subject of termination of derivative actions was restudied.'4
As to limitations, the Commission recommended a ten-year statute,
except where the defendant officer or director was charged with negligent
rather than wilful malfeasance and had not personally profited from the
transaction attacked, in which case a six-year statute would be applicable.
In the writer's view, these recommendations should have been adopted.
Our New York law on limitations in this field has been and is unduly
strict-three years for an action for waste of corporate assets.'5 Nor is
our rule tempered, as it is in many states, by equation of concealment of
the facts to "fraud," enabling action to be brought within a stated period
after discovery of the facts. "Fraud" in our Civil Practice Act, section
48, has been judicially interpreted as limited to a case of actual mis-
11 As our law does now. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61.
12 Hirshfield v. Fitzgerald, 157 N.Y.-166, 51 N.E. 997 (1898); Manufacturers Mutual
Fire Insurance Corp. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 288 N.Y. 688, 43
N.E.2d 71 (1941).
13 Leg. Doc. No. 65 E) at 15-18, 21-38, Report of Law Rev. Com. 143-146, 149-166
(1942); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (J), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 471-563 (1942).
14 Leg. Doc. No. 65 (C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 75-114 (1945).
15 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 48, 49.
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representation.' 6 Rare indeed, under our statutes, is the case in which a
ten-year period of limitations will apply. Under the rule in the majority
of states, concealment of the facts of the transaction on which the deriva-
tive action is based will of itself toll the statute. This is but recognition
of the nature of large corporate enterprise, inherent in which is the ability
of management with comparative ease, to accomplish concealment of the
facts. That being the case, what we do in New York is to let successful
concealment for a comparatively short period provide insulation from
liability.
With respect also to termination of derivative actions, New York
lagged behind. In 1941 and again in 1944 the Commission recommended
legislation adopting the practice which by that time had been embodied
in the Federal Rules, requiring notice to all stockholders of any proposed
compromise which would extinguish the corporate right asserted, and
court approval for any termination of the action. The evil aimed at was
the private settlement or "buy-out" of the plaintiff's shares, often at a
price higher than their market or investment value, followed by a quiet
stipulation of discontinuance and perhaps even a purported "release" of
the corporate claim, without notice to anyone and without court review.
The bills based on the Commission's recommendations failed of passage.
However, the results sought have been attained by decision. The bank-
ruptcy of the Associated Gas & Electric Company system in 1940 brought
to light a long record of "buy-outs," often with the funds of the very cor-
poration for whose "benefit" the action had been brought. The bank-
ruptcy trustees took one such case to the Court of Appeals and there
established the salutary principle that for the "proceeds" of a derivative
action, no matter how obtained, the plaintiff is accountable to the cor-
poration for whose benefit he sued.17 The writer doubts that since the
Clarke decision any substantial "buy-out" settlement of a derivative ac-
tion has been attempted in New York.
LITIGATION EXPENSES
The rising volume of derivative actions throughout the country prior
to the 1940's gave rise to the question whether the corporate official,
either successfully defending or settling an action in which he was
charged with breach of duty should be entitled to reimbursement of the
expenses, counsel fees, etc. incurred by him individually in the process.
16 Gobel v. Hammerslough, 263 App. Div. 1, 31 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288
N.Y. 653, 42 N.E.2d 746 (1942); cf. Druckerman v. Harbord, 31 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1940) (not officially reported).
17 Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
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Wisconsin and New Jersey cases permitted reimbursement on successful
defense in analogy to a trustee's right to reimbursement for the expenses
of successful defense against a surcharge of his account." New York
cases twice denied it on the theory that no benefit to the corporation
could be shown. 9
Following these decisions California, New Jersey, Kentucky, Delaware
and New York enacted statutes. Ours were sections 27-a and 61-a of the
General Corporation Law. Section 27-a permitted a New York corpora-
tion to adopt a by-law providing for indemnity except where the official
was held liable for negligence or malfeasance, but provided no machinery
for determining the right to indemnity in a particular case or the amount
properly payable. Section 61-a provided for the allowance of "special
costs" in an action maintained in the New York courts in which the ap-
plicant was successful in whole or in part or settled with the approval of
the court.
Contemporaneously, many corporations, particularly those whose se-
curities were widely held, began adopting indemnity by-laws. Some of
the statutes20 and by-law provisions were broad enough to permit re-
imbursement not only of actual expense but under certain circumstances,
of amounts paid in compromise of alleged liability.
In 1945 the Commission proposed and the Legislature adopted a re-
vised statutory system for the assessment and payment by corporations
of the proper litigation expenses of officers, directors or employees sued
for breach of duty who either successfully defended themselves or settled
with court approval.2 ' The statute is so drawn as to permit reimburse-
ment by any New York corporation unless its stockholders have taken
inconsistent action, in an amount determined either by a disinterested
board majority or in a court proceeding, and by a foreign corporation
in connection with an action or proceeding brought in a New York court
or in a federal court sitting in New York. In all cases reimbursement is
limited to expenses only and either successful defense or court approved
compromise is a condition precedent to the right to reimbursement.
With but one exception, the cases indicate the scheme works well. That
one exception is the recent case of Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film
18 Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581, 110 N.W. 798 (1906); Solimine v.
Hollander, 129 NJ. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 434 (1941).
'9 Wood v. Noma Electric Corp., N.Y.LJ. Oct. 11, 1936, p. 1121, col. 7 (N.Y. City Ct.
1936) (not officially reported); New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d
844 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1939).
20 E.g. Kentucky L. 1942, c. 40.
21 Laws 1945, c. 869, N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 63-68; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E), Report
of Law Rev. Com. 131-175 (1945).
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Corp.2 decided four to three by the Court of Appeals two years ago.
Schwartz had been indicted with the corporation of which he had been
an officer, for violation of the Anti-Trust Laws. He pleaded not guilty,
and retained counsel to defend himself. Eventually his plea of nolo
contendere was accepted and the case dismissed as to him. A majority
of the Court of Appeals thought the statute not intended to apply to' ex-
pense incurred in the defense of a criminal action. The writer does not
believe that was the intent, and much prefers Judge Fuld's vigorous and
well-reasoned dissent.
CORPORATE GOVERNMENT-CLOSE CORPORATIONS
Lawyers, if not the law itself, have long recognized the real economic
differences between a "public" or "public issue" corporation and a "fam-
ily" or "close" corporation. The Commission has characterized the lat-
ter as one in which "management and ownership are substantially iden-
tical."23 For a number of years lawyers and writers in law reviews
had been suggesting special statutory treatment for the "close" corpora-
tion, urging, among other grounds that various foreign jurisdictions give
it separate treatment. In general, the dispute revolved around the neces-
sity and desirability of giving statutory sanction to the widespread prac-
tice of participants in close corporations to contract among themselves
as individuals as to what they would or would not do in their capacities as
stockholders, directors, officers and employees, in clear derogation of the
statutory scheme of representative corporate government. In varying
degree, they would seek individual veto powers not only over the election
of directors, but as to the hiring or firing of employees or other matters
of day to day administration which in the statutory scheme are matters of
directorial discretion. Our statute is typical,
"The business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of direc-
tors.... Unless otherwise provided, a majority of the board at a meeting
duly assembled shall be necessary to constitute ... a quorum... and the
act of a majority of the directors present... shall be the act of the
board."24
Two lines of authority developed in American courts. In Illinois, for
example, the courts would freely enforce the shareholders' contracts re-
gardless of consistency with statute if no public or creditors' interest
would be harmed thereby. 5 New Jersey and Virginia at least were strict
22 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
23 Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K) at 6, Report of Law Rev. Com. 386 (1948).
24 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 27.
25 See, e.g., Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 11. 589, 73 N.E. 874 (1905); Note 15 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 738 (1948).
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constructionists.28 New York seemed to be in between, drawing a dis-
tinction based on whether or not all stockholders had agreed to the ques-
tioned contract.27
Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel Inc., 8 decided by the Court of Appeals in
1945 by four to three, lined up our state with the strict constructionists.
The majority opinion in Benintendi left no room for doubt that contracts
even among the holders of all outstanding shares in derogation of the
statutory scheme were unenforceable. The corporate bar rose, almost
as one man, demanding legislative remedy. Concern was so wide-
spread that the Commission called a conference, inviting attend-
ance by Bar Association committees, law teachers and individual
lawyers from all over the state. The view most widely held was
that Benintendi should be overruled by statute, while the ques-
tion of possible separate legislative treatment for the close corporation
could be deferred. Adopting this procedure, the Commission recom-
mended and the Legislature enacted in 1948, section 9 of the Stock Cor-
poration Law. It was somewhat revised after further Commission study,
in 1951. 29
There are many interesting facets to this picture. For one thing, the
Commission studied the English "private company," the French "soci&6
A r6sponsabilit6 limit6e," the German and Swiss "Gesellschaft mit Be-
schriinkter H~iftung" and concluded that the analogies were not useful.30
Yet the statute is in fact a "dose corporation law" for our state, because
what it does is to permit provision for unanimity or qualified majority
only when it is adopted by a vote of the holders of at least the qualified
majority of shareholders whose votes are necessary for the action sought
to be restricted. Thus, if unanimity is to be required for any purpose, all
shareholders must consent to the certificate provision which requires it.
This is impractical in any public corporation set-up.
The one real difficulty presented is the increased possibility of dead-
lock through operation of section 9 certificate provisions. As originally
26 Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 AtI. 568 (1910); Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va.
327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944).
27 Cf., e.g. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918) with McQuade v. Stone-
ham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934), and Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641
(1936), discussed in Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 381-427 (1948),
Israels, "The Close Corporation and the Law," 33 Cornell L.Q. 488 (1948) and Delaney,
"The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be Tied in Advance," 50 Colum. L. Rev. 52
(1950).
28 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
29 Laws 1948, c. 862; Laws 1951, c. 717; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law Rev.
Com. 381-427 (1948); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 251-318 (1951).
30 Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K) at 6-36, Report of Law Rev. Corn. 386-416 (1948).
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enacted in 1948"' these provisions were limited to ten years' duration.
In 1951 the limitation was removed.32 Therefore, the experienced practi-
tioner now usually combines his Section 9 certificate provision, with an
agreement that under given circumstances, e.g., deadlock on the board or
among the stockholders, all of the latter will vote their shares for volun-
tary dissolution of the corporation. The writer believes that such an
agreement is specifically enforceable in New York.3 3 However, there may
be danger lurking here. New York has had for many years a "deadlock
statute"--Section 103 of our General Corporation Law. It was revised,
at Commission instance in 1944.34 Unfortunately, even as amended, the
statute appears consonant with the all too generally accepted view that
dissolution of a corporation is something drastic, a remedy to be applied
even in a clear deadlock case with extreme caution. On this subject the
writer has said elsewhere that "deadlock ... or stalemate in a close cor-
poration is as completely socially undesirable as in a partnership or in
a marriage and ... the corporate contract is not a holy sacrament."
3 5
The Commission in its Recommendation of the 1944 amendment to our
deadlock statute said: "A final order dissolving the corporation does not
and will not under the amendment inexorably follow.... It must appear
to the Court that dissolution will be beneficial to the stockholders or
members and not injurious to the public (Gen. Corp. Law § 117). .... 1131
Unfortunately, our New York courts have used the language quoted by
the Commission from section 117 of the General Corporation Law to ac-
complish something which certainly the Commission never anticipated,
i.e., to impose a sort of "clean hands" doctrine upon the plaintiff in a dis-
solution case no matter how clearly insoluble the deadlock."
Here we cite the third and most recent four to three decision of our
Court of Appeals, Matter of Radom & Neidorff, Inc.,"5 which in the
writer's view, unfortunately again looks backward. The deadlock be-
tween the stockholders was as clear as crystal. However, the corporation
-up to the time of the decision-had been prosperous because one of the
31 Laws 1948, c. 862.
32 Laws 1951, c. 717.
33 In re Block's Will, 186 Misc. 945, 60 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Surr. Ct. Bronx County 1946);
Accord, Leventhal v. Atlantic Finance Co., 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E.2d 20 (1944). Cf.
Flanagan v. Flanagan, 273 App. Div. 918, 79 N.Y.S.2d 862 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y.
787, 83 N.E.2d 473 (1948).
34 Laws 1944, c. 186, Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 349-377 (1944).
35 Israels, "The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence, Problems of Deadlock and Dis-
solution," 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778, 789 (1952).
36 Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K) at 6, Report of Law Rev. Com. 354 (1944).
37 See, e.g. Matter of Catelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949).
38 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
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stockholders was continuing to run its business without salary, which he
could not collect because the other stockholder would not join in signing
a salary check. Judge Fuld's dissent is down to earth:
Although respondent relies on the fact that the corporation is now
solvent and operating at a profit, it is manifest that, if petitioner carries
out his plan to resign as president and quits the business, there may be
irreparable loss, not alone to him and respondent as owners of the corpora-
tion, but also to the corporation's creditors.... Whether the petition should
or should not be entertained surely cannot be made to turn on proof that
the corporation is on the verge of ruin or insolvency.
It is well known that a general revision of our corporation laws is long
overdue. Indeed, it is a perennial proposal and in the writer's view it
should, in the not too far future, be assigned to the Commission with an
appropriation ample to accomplish it. Short of that desirable goal, the
deadlock section and one other-Stock Corporation Law section 58, deal-
ing with dividends-seem to the writer most in need of further study and
revision. Several times in its reports the Commission has noted as "work
in progress" studies of section 58, but no publication has followed. The
task would not be easy. It should call for further progress in the slowly
evolving integration of legal and accounting theory and techniques. The
high standard set by the Commission over twenty years in this and other
fields gives confidence the challenge would be met.
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